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A MILITARY RESPONSE TO A WARMING
WORLD: FEDERALISM, MILITIAS, AND
CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS
SAMANTHA OLSON*
‘‘It’s a question, once again, of being forward deployed, forward
engaged, and be in a position to respond to the kinds of natural disasters
that I think we see as a second or third order effect of climate change.’’
– Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford1
INTRODUCTION
Climate change is a threat to national security, a threat that the
United States Department of Defense has explicitly recognized. In
addition to exacerbating conflicts overseas, climate change threatens
American lives through violent storms, wildfires, floods, droughts, and
other natural disasters. The United States Armed Forces and the
National Guard are called upon to both defend American interests
abroad and to protect Americans from disaster at home. Some states
also call on their State Defense Forces—military forces controlled and
funded by individual states—to respond to natural disasters. While
Federal and state military forces both play a significant role in disaster
response, Federal military forces and federalized National Guard are
prohibited from functioning as law enforcement in these scenarios
under the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). State Defense Forces and statecontrolled National Guard are not subject to the PCA.
This restriction generally does not impede the function of these
military forces in disaster response, and Presidential invocation of the
Insurrection Act may even override this restriction in extreme
situations. However, federalism concerns and questions regarding the
appropriate use of the Insurrection Act likely slowed the federal
military response to Hurricane Katrina, adding further confusion to an

Copyright © 2019 Samantha Olson.
* Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2020; University of Miami, B.A. 2016.
1. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91 § 335, 131
Stat. 1283, 1357 (2017), https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ91/PLAW-115publ91.pdf
[hereinafter National Defense Authorization Act 2018].
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already chaotic situation. As a result of ongoing climate change and
warming oceans, hurricanes are likely increasing in severity and
threatening greater swaths of the coast. These changes could
potentially result in more catastrophic natural disasters similar to
Hurricane Katrina.
This note draws on earlier scholarship concerning the Insurrection
Act and federalism in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and incorporates
new information regarding the impacts of climate change on natural
disasters in the United States. In light of intensifying hurricanes,
flooding, and other extreme weather events, this note argues for
clarifying when and how federal military forces and federalized
National Guard may be used to respond to natural disasters. This note
argues for an amended Insurrection Act that provides the President
greater flexibility to respond quickly to catastrophic natural disasters
and clarifies when it can be invoked. This note also argues for the
expansion of state capabilities for disaster response through the use of
State Defense Forces as a way for states to better prepare for
increasingly severe weather events and avoid the need for Federal
intervention through the Insurrection Act.
Part I of this note will discuss the threat of climate change and the
Department of Defense’s response. Parts II and III of this note will
address the statutory background of disaster response and the use of
the military domestically. Part IV will cover the relevant military forces
responsible for disaster response. Part V will examine two hurricane
scenarios and how they offer insight into effective preparedness and
response to increasingly severe weather events. Finally, Part VI will
offer potential statutory and policy changes to better address the
growing threat of natural disasters.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE AS A NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT
Climate change poses a significant threat to the United States by
exacerbating the impact of extreme weather events.2 Because of these
domestic impacts and climate change’s effects on stability across the
globe, the United States Department of Defense has explicitly
recognized it as a threat to national security since 2010.3 The United
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has
2. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 69 (Rajendra K. Pachauri et al. eds. 2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessme
nt-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_All_Topics.pdf [hereinafter IPCC 2014 SYNTHESIS
REPORT].
3. See infra Part I.B.
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stated that “[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since
the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over
decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the
amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea level has risen.”4
The 2014 report also concluded with “very high confidence” that “[i]n
urban areas, climate change is projected to increase risks . . . from heat
stress, storms and extreme precipitation, inland and coastal flooding,
landslides, air pollution, drought, water scarcity, sea level rise and
storm surges.”5 Although the IPCC report could not determine
hurricane trends because of “observational limitations,” the IPCC
concluded that “it is virtually certain that intense tropical cyclone
activity has increased in the North Atlantic since 1970.”6
Climate change worsens many weather events, but hurricanes and
their associated events, such as storm surges, pose particularly
significant threats to the United States.7 Hurricanes strike some of the
most populous regions in the country and threaten critical
infrastructure, such as power plants, ports, and military bases.8 Unlike
other extreme weather events, they also frequently require a significant
military response to assist with disaster relief.9 The following sections
will review the impacts of climate change on security, both abroad and
at home, focusing on the unique threat of natural disasters in the
United States, followed by a discussion on the military’s affirmation of
climate change and recognition of it as a threat to national security.

4. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 2 (2014), https://archive.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/syr/
AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf [hereinafter IPCC 2014 SUMMARY].
5. IPCC 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2.
6. Id. at 53.
7. See infra Part I.A.
8. See infra Part I.A.
9. See CTR. FOR LAW & MILITARY OPERATIONS (CLAMO), DOMESTIC DISASTER
RESPONSE 2017 HURRICANES HARVEY, IRMA, AND MARIA: LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE
ADVOCATES 8 (2018), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Domestic-DisasterResponse_%202017.pdf [hereinafter CLAMO DOMESTIC DISASTER RESPONSE] (noting that the
2017 hurricane season saw the activation of more than 50,000 members of the National Guard).
While other extreme weather events, such as floods and wildfires, also require activating the
National Guard for support, the response is usually not as extensive as that of hurricanes. See Jim
Garamone, DEP’T OF DEF., Guardsmen Bring Combat Skills to Fighting Western Fires, (Aug. 16,
2018) https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1604180/guardsmen-bring-combat-skills-tofighting-western-fires/ (noting that “1,000 California National Guardsmen have been called up to
assist in the firefighting effort”).
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A. Climate Change: A Threat at Home and Abroad
Climate change affects the entire globe and is likely to impact food
and water security, severely damage infrastructure, and even submerge
some sovereign nations under rising seas.10 The IPCC noted that
“[c]limate change can indirectly increase risks of violent conflict by
amplifying well-documented drivers of these conflicts, such as poverty
and economic shocks.”11 Former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army
Gordon Sullivan echoed this concern stating, ‘‘[C]limate change is a
national security issue . . . climate instability will lead to instability in
geopolitics and impact American military operations around the
world.”12
While climate impacts are likely to exacerbate conflicts around the
world, climate change also poses increased threats to Americans.
According to the IPCC, the United States is threatened by three key
risks:
1) “[w]ildfire-induced loss of ecosystem integrity, property loss,
human morbidity, and mortality as a result of increased drying
trend and temperature trend;”13
2) “heat-related human mortality;”14 and
3) “[u]rban floods in riverine and coastal areas, inducing
property and infrastructure damage; supply chain, ecosystem,
and social system disruption; public health impacts; and water
quality impairment, due to sea level rise, extreme
precipitation, and cyclones.”15
In November 2018 alone, two fires devastated California and
claimed 89 lives.16 Two major hurricanes also wrought havoc on the
10. See Nathanial Gronewold, Island Nations May Keep Some Sovereignty if Rising Seas
Make Them Uninhabitable, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2011),
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.
nytimes.com/cwire/2011/05/25/25climatewire-island-nations-may-keep-some-sovereignty-if63590.html?pagewanted=all.
11. IPCC 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 73.
12. National Defense Authorization Act 2018, supra note 1.
13. Patricia Romero-Lankao et al., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 1477 (2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Ashley McBride, Camp Fire: Death Toll Rises to 86 After Hospitalized Man Dies from
Burn Injuries, S.F. CHRONICLE (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/californiawildfires/article/Camp-Fire-Death-toll-rises-to-86-after-13458956.php; Gabby Ferreira, Woolsey
Fire Death Toll Rises to 3 After Body is Found in Burned-Out Home, SAN LUIS OBISPO
TRIBUNE (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.sanluisobispo.com/news/state/california/fires/article
221654060.html.
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southeastern United States in the fall of 2018, resulting in over 90
deaths and billions of dollars in damage.17 In addition to wildfires and
hurricanes, other extreme weather events are also increasing in
frequency or severity. The number of tornadoes occurring in
southeastern states is increasing;18 severe floods are likely to increase
in frequency; and western states are more likely to experience longer
periods of drought.19
Although it is impossible to directly link any single natural disaster
to climate change, general trends in extreme weather events in recent
years can be attributed to rising global surface temperatures.20 Recent
studies have found that climate change intensified the rainfall of
Hurricanes Katrina, Irma, and Maria by between four and nine
percent21 and that climate change “likely resulted in a ~20% increase”
in Hurricane Harvey’s accumulated precipitation.22 Other research has
linked climate change to an overall decrease in tropical storms and

17. Doyle Rice, Monsters Florence and Michael Powered the Deadly, Destructive Atlantic
Hurricane Season that Ends Friday, USA TODAY (Nov. 29, 2018, 1:25PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/11/29/hurricane-season-ends-florence-andmichael-left-death-destruction/2148341002/; Leslie Scism & Erin Ailworth, Moody’s Pegs
Florence’s Economic Cost at $38 Billion to $50 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2018, 7:22PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/moodys-pegs-florences-economic-cost-at-38-billion-to-50-billion1537572161.
18. Vittorio A. Gensini & Harold E. Brooks, Spatial Trends in United States Tornado
frequency, 38 CLIMATE & ATMOSPHERIC SCI. 1, 1 (2018).
19. See THOMAS JOHNSON ET AL., IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 150 (D.R. Reidmiller et al. eds. 2018)
(summarizing how various regions of the United States will be impacted by floods or droughts);
see also PATRICK GONZALEZ ET AL., IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 1112 (D.R. Reidmiller et al. eds. 2018)
(“With continued greenhouse gas emissions, higher temperatures would cause more frequent and
severe droughts in the Southwest.”).
20. “Climate” is the average weather conditions over a long period of time, usually 30 years
or more. “Climate change” generally refers to changes in the average weather conditions, such as
average high and low temperatures and precipitation. For example, Hurricane Irma was a singular
weather event. Climate change did not cause Hurricane Irma, but climate change—particularly
increases in the average temperature of the ocean—could increase the intensity and frequency of
hurricanes in general. Thus, climate change enhances the conditions that can lead to natural
disasters, like hurricanes and wildfires. See Christina M. Patricola & Michael F. Wehner,
Anthropogenic Influences on Major Tropical Cyclone Events, 563 NATURE 339, 339 (2018) (“Seasurface temperature (SST) warming has been observed and is expected to continue, which would
intensify tropical cyclones.”).
21. Id. at 345.
22. S-Y Simon Wang et al., Quantitative Attribution of Climate Effects on Hurricane
Harvey’s Extreme Rainfall in Texas, 13 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 8 (2018).
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hurricanes but an increase in the intensity of hurricanes.23
Alternatively, recent models have also predicted an increase in the
frequency, intensity, and intensification distribution of hurricanes over
the next century.24
While scientists continue to study and debate the impact of climate
change on hurricanes, one thing is certain: people continue moving to
and developing hurricane-prone areas along the Atlantic and Gulf
Coasts. In 2016, approximately 94 million people lived directly adjacent
to the coast.25 Of that 94 million, approximately 59.6 million lived in
the Atlantic and Gulf Coast regions, up from 51.9 million in 2000.26
Major coastal cities at risk of hurricanes, flooding, and sea level rise
include Miami, Tampa, Jacksonville, Houston, Washington, D.C., and
even New York City.27
While climate change threatens ever greater numbers of
Americans as they move to vulnerable coastal cities, it also poses a
serious threat to infrastructure. Hurricanes threaten nuclear power
plants, military installations, and major ports with inundation, in
addition to hundreds of billions of dollars in commercial and
residential real estate.28 Over time the impacts of rising sea levels,
combined with storm surges from hurricanes, will threaten greater and
greater swaths of the coastal United States.29
B. The U.S. Military as a Climate Change Affirmer
The Department of Defense (DoD) recognizes climate change as
a national security threat and is actively addressing climate-related
vulnerabilities to military infrastructure across the globe.30 The military
23. Thomas R. Knutson et al., Dynamical Downscaling Projections of Twenty-First-Century
Atlantic Hurricane Activity: CMIP3 and CMIP5 Model-Based Scenarios, 26 J. CLIMATE 6591, 6616
(2013).
24. Kieran Bhatia et al., Projected Response of Tropical Cyclone Intensity and Intensification
in a Global Climate Model, 31 J. CLIMATE 8281, 8295, 8297 (2018).
25. Darryl T. Cohen, 60 Million Live in the Path of Hurricanes, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug.
6, 2018), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/08/coastal-county-population-rises.html.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Romero-Lankao et al., supra note 13, at 1474 (discussing climate responses in
New York City).
28. See Krishna Rao, Climate Change and Housing: Will a Rising Tide Sink All Homes?,
ZILLOW RESEARCH (June 2, 2017), https://www.zillow.com/research/climate-changeunderwater-homes-12890/ (“Nationwide, almost 1.9 million homes (or roughly 2 percent of all
U.S. homes)—worth a combined $882 billion—are at risk of being underwater by 2100.”).
29. See generally Romero-Lankao et al., supra note 13.
30. See DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON EFFECTS OF A CHANGING CLIMATE TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (2019), https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/29/2002084200/-1/1/1/CLIMATE-CHANGE-REPORT-2019.PDF [hereinafter 2019 DOD CLIMATE CHANGE
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has been aware of the threat posed by climate change since at least
1990;31 however, DoD did not seriously consider climate change until
the CNA Corporation and 11 retired military officers released a report
in 2007 addressing climate change as a national security threat.32 The
report found that climate change posed a threat to national security by
affecting extreme weather events and increasing tensions in both
unstable and stable portions of the world.33 It also noted that climate
change has the “potential to create sustained natural and humanitarian
disasters on a scale far beyond those we see today” and provided
recommendations to address these risks, such as incorporating climate
change into national security strategies and working with developing
countries to increase resiliency and capacity to respond to climate
impacts.34
Following the CNA Military Advisory Report, DoD recognized
the need to address climate change as a security threat in its 2008
National Defense Strategy.35 However, DoD did not explicitly draw the
link between climate change and national security until the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR Report), a legislativelymandated review of DoD’s national security strategies.36 The QDR
Report stated, “Climate change will affect DoD in two broad ways.
First, climate change will shape the operating environment, roles, and
REPORT]; see generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-206, CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION: DOD NEEDS TO BETTER INCORPORATE ADAPTATION INTO PLANNING AND
COLLABORATION AT OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS (2017); CURT D. STORLAZZI ET AL., RC-2334,
THE IMPACT OF SEA-LEVEL RISE AND CLIMATE CHANGE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSTALLATIONS ON ATOLLS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN (2017).
31. See generally Terry P. Kelley, Global Climate Change Implications for the United States
Navy (unpublished research, Naval War College) (available via FOIA request at
http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/weather/climatechange/globalclimatechangenavy.pdf) (“Global climate change poses a multifaceted challenge to the Navy over the next halfcentury. This challenge will impact naval operations, facilities, and systems, and affect resource
allocations.”).
32. CNA CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (2007),
https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/national%20security%20and%20the%20threat%20of%20cli
mate%20change.pdf.
33. Id. at 6–7.
34. Id. at 6; id. at 7–8.
35. See
DEP’T
OF
DEF.,
NATIONAL
DEFENSE
STRATEGY
4
(2008),
http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2008NationalDefenseStrategy.pdf (“Over the next twenty years
physical pressures—population, resource, energy, climatic and environmental—could combine
with rapid social, cultural, technological and geopolitical change to create greater uncertainty.”).
36. See 10 U.S.C. § 118(a) (2012) (repealed by National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. 97-295, § 941(b)(1), 130 Stat. 2000, 2367) (“The Secretary of Defense
shall every four years . . . conduct a comprehensive examination . . . of the national defense
strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other
elements of the defense program and policies of the United States.”).
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missions that we undertake. . . . Second, DoD will need to adjust to the
impacts of climate change on our facilities and military capabilities.”37
DoD continues to recognize the need for the military in disaster
response, noting “extreme weather events may lead to increased
demands for defense support to civil authorities for humanitarian
assistance or disaster response both within the United States and
Overseas.”38 The DoD 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap
took an even more aggressive stance on climate change:
A changing climate will have real impacts on our military and the
way it executes its missions. The military could be called upon more
often to support civil authorities, and provide humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief in the face of more frequent and more
intense natural disasters. Our coastal installations are vulnerable to
rising sea levels and increased flooding, while droughts, wildfires,
and more extreme temperatures could threaten many of our training
activities. Our supply chains could be impacted, and we will need to
ensure our critical equipment works under more extreme weather
conditions. Weather has always affected military operations, and as
the climate changes, the way we execute operations may be altered
or constrained.39

Despite the Trump Administration dropping climate change from
the National Security Strategy issued in 2017,40 DoD continues to treat
it as a national security risk and has published several reports on the
U.S. military’s vulnerabilities since recognizing climate change as a
security threat in 2008.41 The latest report from January 2019 studied

37. DEP’T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 84–85 (2010),
http://archive.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2029JAN10%201600.pdf.
38. Id. at 85.
39. Chuck Hagel, Foreword to DEP’T OF DEF., 2014 CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION
ROADMAP (2014), https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/downloads/CCARprint_wForward_e.pdf.
40. Compare
WHITE
HOUSE,
NATIONAL
SECURITY
STRATEGY
(2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (only
referring to “climate policies” in regards to energy dominance), with WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY 12 (2015), http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf
(listing climate change as one of the major threats to national security). The Obama
Administration’s National Security Strategy goes on to state that:
Climate change is an urgent and growing threat to our national security, contributing to
increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources like food and
water. The present day effects of climate change are being felt from the Arctic to the
Midwest. Increased sea levels and storm surges threaten coastal regions, infrastructure, and
property. In turn, the global economy suffers, compounding the growing costs of preparing
and restoring infrastructure.
WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 12 (2015).
41. See, e.g., 2019 DOD CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT, supra note 30; see, e.g., OFFICE OF THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS, DEP’T OF DEF.,
CLIMATE-RELATED RISK TO DOD INFRASTRUCTURE INITIAL VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
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the impacts of five “climate-related events”—recurrent flooding,
drought, desertification, wildfires, and thawing permafrost—on
seventy-nine military installations.42 The report found that “[a]bout
two-thirds of the 79 installations addressed . . . are vulnerable to
current or future recurrent flooding” and provided recommendations
for improving DoD’s research and resiliency.43 Over the last ten years,
climate change has become a serious consideration for the U.S. military
as a national security threat and will likely continue to be treated as
such in the future.44
Some scholars have expressed concerns over DoD’s inclusion of
nontraditional risks, like climate change, within the national security
framework.45 After the end of the Cold War, DoD adopted a broader
view of national security threats incorporating “anything that presented
a potential harm to the United States.”46 Historically, national security
was concerned with protecting the Union and American sovereignty
from hostile foreign nations or organizations.47 Perhaps, some argue,
the military should withdraw from its involvement in climate change
and disaster relief and leave such tasks to specialized agencies. In the
words of Justice Black, “It is the primary business of armies and navies
to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise.”48
On the other hand, the military is uniquely positioned to legitimize
climate change concerns. Americans consistently give the military the
highest confidence rating of any American institution.49 While more
Republicans have acknowledged climate change in recent years, there

SURVEY REPORT (2018), https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/tab-b-slvasreport-1-24-2018.pdf; DEP’T OF THE NAVY, U.S. NAVY CLIMATE CHANGE ROADMAP (2010),
https://www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/ccr.pdf; STORLAZZI ET AL., supra note 30.
42. 2019 DOD CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT, supra note 30, at 4.
43. Id. at 16.
44. See, e.g. id. at 2 (“DoD must be able to adapt current and future operations to address
the impacts of a variety of threats and conditions, including those from weather and natural
events.”) (emphasis added).
45. See Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573,
1715 (noting that categorizing climate change as a national security threat allows the military to
acquire more resources and may remove the dialogue around climate change solutions from open,
public discourse).
46. Id. at 1708 (emphasis in original).
47. Id. at 1576.
48. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
49. Frank Newport, U.S. Confidence in Military Reflects Perceived Competency, GALLUP
(July 27, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/214511/high-confidence-military-reflects-perceivedcompetency.aspx.
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is still a wide gap between Democrats’ and Republicans’ views.50 Given
Republicans tend to view the military more positively than Democrats,
the military’s position may shift Republican’s perceptions of climate
change.51 The military has also been a “norm leader in arenas such as
the racial integration of American society, and the importance of
patriotic values in encouraging civilian recycling during World War II,
among others.”52 Actions taken by the military, like utilizing renewable
energy and assessing climate risks to infrastructure, legitimize the risks
of climate change and set a positive precedent for other agencies and
citizens.53
Regardless of the proper role of DoD in recognizing climate
change as a national security threat, the military forces play an
important role in disaster response and will continue to do so for the
foreseeable future. The 2017 hurricane season was the costliest, as well
as one of the deadliest, on record.54 The hurricane response “involved
43 States and resulted in the activation of more than 50,000 members
of the National Guard.”55 It required a massive mobilization effort on
the part of local, state, and Federal governments, including active-duty
troops, the National Guard, and State Defense Forces.
II. U.S. DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY
Disaster management requires a coordinated effort across local,
state, tribal, and federal governments, NGOs, and private businesses.
Disaster management and response in the United States “takes a
50. Climate Concerns Increase; Most Republicans Now Acknowledge Change, MONMOUTH
UNIV. POLLING INST., (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-institute/documents/
monmouthpoll_us_112918.pdf/; see also Cary Funk & Meg Hefferon, Many Republican
Millennials Differ With Older Party Members on Climate Change and Energy Issues, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (May 14, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/14/manyrepublican-millennials-differ-with-older-party-members-on-climate-change-and-energy-issues/
(“About a third (36%) of Millennials in the GOP say the Earth is warming mostly due to human
activity, double the share of Republicans in the Baby Boomer or older generations.”).
51. See Jim Norman, Americans Give Military Branches Similar High Marks, GALLUP (May
26, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/211112/americans-give-military-branches-similar-highmarks.aspx (“The biggest gaps in favorable opinion [of the military] are between Republicans and
Democrats.”).
52. Sarah E. Light, Valuing National Security: Climate Change, the Military, and Society, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1772, 1776 (2014).
53. See generally id.
54. Doyle Rice, 2017’s Three Monster Hurricanes — Harvey, Irma and Maria — Among Five
Costliest Ever, USA TODAY (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/weather/
2018/01/30/2017-s-three-monster-hurricanes-harvey-irma-and-maria-among-five-costliestever/1078930001/.
55. CLAMO DOMESTIC DISASTER RESPONSE, supra note 9.
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‘bottom up’ approach”, with initial responsibility falling on local
governments, emergency responders, and volunteer groups.56 If local
personnel are overwhelmed, state or tribal governments usually step in
to bolster local efforts; when necessary, the state governor will issue a
state disaster or emergency declaration. In most instances, the federal
government will only step in when state and local resources are
overwhelmed.57 The Stafford Act provides the statutory authority and
framework for federal disaster response. Section 101 of the Stafford
Act states that:
The Congress hereby finds and declares that (1) because disasters
often cause loss of life, human suffering, loss of income, and property
loss and damage; and (2) because disasters often disrupt the normal
functioning of governments and communities, and adversely affect
individuals and families with great severity; special measures,
designed to assist the efforts of the affected States in expediting the
rendering of aid, assistance, and emergency services, and the
reconstruction and rehabilitation of devastated areas, are
necessary.58

Congress intended “to provide an orderly and continuing means
of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local
governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the
suffering and damage which result from such disasters.”59 Even when a
state or tribal government requests aid, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) and other federal agencies
“supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local
governments, and disaster relief organizations” and only take control
of management in extraordinary situations.60
Upon request of the governor or the Chief Executive of a tribal
government for assistance, the President may declare that a major
disaster or emergency exists in the affected area.61 However, the type

56. JARED T. BROWN & BRUCE R. LINDSAY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41981,
CONGRESSIONAL PRIMER ON RESPONDING TO MAJOR DISASTERS AND EMERGENCIES 1 (2018).
57. See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act § 401, 42 U.S.C.
§ 5170 (2018) (“All requests for a declaration by the President that a major disaster exists . . . shall
be based on a finding that the disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is
beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that Federal assistance
is necessary.”).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(a) (2018).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b).
60. 42 U.S.C. §5122(2) (2018); see also BROWN & LINDSAY, supra note 56 (“[E]xcept in the
most extraordinary circumstances, local and state/tribal governments are in charge of the disaster
response.”).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 5170; 42 U.S.C. § 5191 (2018). “Emergency” is defined as:
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of declaration impacts the assistance a state receives. An emergency
declaration can occur “in advance or anticipation of the imminent
impact of an incident that threaten such destruction as could result in
a major disaster,”62 but it is more limited in scope than major disaster
declarations and is intended for short-term situations. Major disaster
declarations, on the other hand, can trigger a wide variety of Federal
recovery programs, many focused on the long-term recovery of
individuals and the community, in the wake of disaster.63
The DoD is one of the Federal agencies called into action by the
Stafford Act. The Act provides a general rule for “utilization of DoD
resources”:
During the immediate aftermath of an incident which may ultimately
qualify for assistance under . . . this Act, the Governor of the State
in which such incident occurred may request the President to direct
the Secretary of Defense to utilize the resources of the Department
of Defense for the purpose of performing on public and private lands
any emergency work which is made necessary by such incident and
which is essential for the preservation of life and property. If the
President determines that such work is essential for the preservation
of life and property, the President shall grant such request to the
extent the President determines practicable. Such emergency work
may only be carried out for a period not to exceed 10 days.64

[A]ny occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal
assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and
to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a
catastrophe in any part of the United States.
42 U.S.C. § 5122(1). “Major disaster” is defined as:
[A]ny natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, winddriven
water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm,
or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United
States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and
magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts
and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in
alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.
42 U.S.C. § 5122(2).
62. The Disaster Declaration Process, FEMA, (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.fema.gov/disasterdeclaration-process; see also 42 U.S.C. § 5192(c) (2018) (“The President shall promulgate and
maintain guidelines to assist Governors in requesting the declaration of an emergency in advance
of a natural or man-made disaster (including for the purpose of seeking assistance with special
needs and other evacuation efforts) under this section by defining the types of assistance available
to affected States and the circumstances under which such requests are likely to be approved.”).
63. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5174 (2018) (Federal Assistance to Individuals and Households);
42 U.S.C. § 5177 (2018) (Unemployment Assistance); 42 U.S.C. § 5182 (2018) (Legal Services);
42 U.S.C. § 5183 (2018) (Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training); 42 U.S.C. § 5184 (2018)
(Community Disaster Loans).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 5170b (2018).
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In addition to the Stafford Act, the National Response
Framework (NRF) and DoD directives outline the various roles and
responsibilities of the military’s federal disaster response.65 The NRF
mobilizes all levels of disaster response, from local faith groups to
federal departments, and serves as a “guide to how the Nation
responds to all types of disasters and emergencies.”66 The DoD
Directive on Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) provides
guidance on how federal military forces can respond to emergencies
and, in particular, outlines when they can quell civil disturbances.67
In response to natural disasters, the military can quickly provide
disciplined personnel, expertise, and equipment to aid relief efforts.
The federal government and many states organize their disaster
response according to fifteen Emergency Support Functions (ESFs),
such as “Transportation” and “Communications,” that outline which
agencies take a lead role and which act in support.68 The NRF assigns
lead agencies and support agencies to the ESFs depending on the
agencies’ specific capabilities. For example, the Department of
Transportation (DOT) is the lead agency for the Transportation ESF
because DOT has the expertise and capability to maintain critical
transportation systems and infrastructure during an emergency. Of the
fifteen ESFs, the NRF designates DoD and the Army Corps of
Engineers as the lead coordinating agencies for the Public Works and
Engineering ESF, respectively.69
On the state level, the National Guard plays a similar role to DoD.
For example, Washington State organizes its disaster response
according to ESFs like the NRF.70 There, the Adjutant General both
commands all Washington Army and Air National Guard forces and
65. See generally DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK i (3d ed.
2016) [hereinafter NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK]; DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 3025.18, DEFENSE
SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (Dec. 29, 2010), http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents
/DD/issuances/dodd/302518p.pdf?ver=2018-03-19-093120-683 [hereinafter DSCA].
66. NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, supra note 65.
67. See generally DSCA, supra note 65.
68. NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, supra note 65, at 33. The Framework provides
fifteen ESFs: Transportation; Communications; Public Works and Engineering; Firefighting;
Information and Planning; Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human
Services; Logistics; Public Health and Medical Services; Search and Rescue; Oil and Hazardous
Materials Response; Agriculture and Natural Resources; Energy; Public Safety and Security;
Long-term Community Recovery (superseded by National Disaster Recovery Framework); and
External Affairs. Id. at 34–37.
69. Id. at 34.
70. See generally WASH. MILITARY DEP’T EMERGENCY MGMT. DIV., COMPREHENSIVE
EMERGENCY MGMT. PLAN 84 (2016), https://mil.wa.gov/uploads/pdf/PLANS/final-wacempbasic-plan-june2016-signed.pdf.
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serves as Director of the State’s Emergency Management and
Enhanced 911 programs.71 The Washington Military Department
Emergency Management Division serves as the coordinating agency
for three ESFs, while the Washington Military Department’s National
Guard serves as the lead coordinating agency for one ESF and serves
as a supporting agency for eleven others.72
The National Guard and federal military forces are well-equipped
to provide support for transportation, communication, and search and
rescue, among other functions. Many National Guard units have access
to “wheeled vehicles capable of traversing varied terrain” including
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs).73 Some
Army National Guard units are also capable of providing aviation
support, like utility helicopters and light fixed-wing aircraft.74 National
Guard armories also have important communication abilities—they
“operate[] high-frequency (HF) radios for long-range communication
and ultra high-frequency (UHF) and very high-frequency radios
(VHF) for short-range coordination of field activities.”75 Hurricane
Katrina exposed gaps in communication to which the Army has
responded by developing “high-tech capabilities that enable rapid,
inter-agency communications during an emergency.”76 One of these is
Joint Incident Site Communications Capability which includes
communication vehicles equipped with radio and satellite
communications and Internet capabilities to establish remote
command posts.77 These capabilities are essential when traditional
communication systems are overwhelmed or inoperable following a
natural disaster. While the military’s support capabilities are
“generally derived from DoD warfighting capabilities,”78 many of the

71. The Adjutant General, Washington, WASH. MILITARY DEP’T., https://mil.wa.gov/aboutus/the-adjutant-general (last visited Dec. 12, 2018).
72. Id. at 84.
73. James Stuhltrager, Send in the Guard: The National Guard Response to Natural
Disasters, 20 NAT. RESOURCE & ENV’T 21, 22 (2006).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 23.
76. Claire Heininger, Army Provides Mobile Satellite Communications for Disaster Response,
U.S. ARMY (Jan. 24, 2011), https://www.army.mil/article/50731/army_provides_mobile_satellite_
communications_for_disaster_response.
77. Id.; see also Stuhltrager, supra note 73, at 23 (“Some states – such as Florida,
Pennsylvania, and Texas – are equipped with the Interim SATCOM Incident Site Command Set
(ISISCS), which provides a comprehensive suite of satellite communication, Internet, video
conference, and radio/phone interoperability.”).
78. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-28, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES
I-3 (2018).
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same capabilities necessary on the battlefield have useful domestic
applications as well.
III. THE USE OF THE MILITARY IN DOMESTIC ARENAS
The role of the U.S. military in ordinary, domestic affairs is
extremely limited and regulated. Military forces—active duty troops,
the National Guard, and State Defense Forces—can be relied upon for
disaster support; however, the abilities of federal military forces are
more limited than those of the National Guard or State Defense
Forces. Under the Posse Comitatus Act, federal troops cannot be used
for any domestic law enforcement activities without Congressional
authorization.79 State-controlled troops such as the National Guard or
a State Defense Force, are not subject to the restrictions of the Posse
Comitatus Act and can enforce laws.80 In extraordinary circumstances,
such as those under the Insurrection Act, federal military forces may
be utilized to enforce laws;81 however, such circumstances rarely arise.
Following a natural disaster, both federal and state troops can
assist with recovery efforts such as maintaining communication lines or
performing search and rescue missions. In most natural disaster
scenarios, the Posse Comitatus Act does not restrict the military’s
capabilities in any meaningful way because governors can rely on their
own National Guard units and those of neighboring states to respond
without relying heavily on federal military forces. However, the events
of Hurricane Katrina provide an insightful example into how these
Acts may hinder disaster response.82 As hurricanes become
increasingly severe and threaten significant portions of the Atlantic
and Gulf Coasts as a result of climate change, the Posse Comitatus Act
and inflexibility of the Insurrection Act may inhibit the ability of the
President to respond quickly and effectively to catastrophic natural
disasters.
A. The Posse Comitatus Act
The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) reflects the deeply held
American fear of military intrusion into domestic affairs. King
George’s use of soldiers to control and suppress unruly colonists
“affronted the English tradition against domestic use of military

79.
80.
81.
82.

18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2018).
See id. (applying to the Army and Air Force); see also infra Part IV.
10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55 (2018).
See infra Part V.
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troops” and was a catalyst for the American Revolution.83 The
Declaration of Independence lists King George’s “[keeping] among us,
in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our
legislatures” and “render[ing] the Military independent of and superior
to the Civil Power” as examples of the English Crown’s “repeated
injuries and usurpations.”84 The Founding Fathers reacted to these
egregious violations by subordinating the American military to civilian
control and limiting the use of the military domestically to
extraordinary circumstances.85
The events surrounding the Civil War and the use of federal troops
during Reconstruction spurred the passage of the PCA in 1877.86
Federal troops were relied on to execute the laws as southern state
governments were rebuilt following the Civil War.87 The placement of
federal troops at polling places during the election of 1876 and the
subsequent contested results, in particular, led Congress to act.88 The
text of the PCA reads:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any
part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise
to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.89

The language of the PCA leaves room for exceptions—the PCA
does not apply “under circumstances expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress.”90 Congress has used this clause to

83. David Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution: The Law and History of Military Troops
in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1, 24 (1971).
84. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
85. E.g., U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the
actual Service of the United States . . . .”); U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each
of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”) (emphasis added); see also William
C. Banks, Providing “Supplemental Security”—The Insurrection Act and the Military Role in
Responding to Domestic Crises, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 39, 39 (2009) (“Because the
military grew out of our nation’s revolutionary and constitutional heritage, its subordination to
civilian control has been a central feature of our government since its beginning.”).
86. Scott R. Tkacz, In Katrina’s Wake: Rethinking the Military’s Role in Domestic
Emergencies, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 301, 307–08 (2006).
87. Id. at 308.
88. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42659, THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT AND RELATED
MATTERS: THE USE OF THE MILITARY TO EXECUTE CIVILIAN LAW 21 (2018).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2018).
90. Id.
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create many statutory exceptions to the PCA, including the
Insurrection Act.91
B. The Insurrection Act
While the Founding Fathers recognized the perils of an unfettered
military, the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit the use of federal
troops to control civilians. Recognizing that the federal army may need
to defend the fledgling country from domestic rebellion, Congress
quickly authorized the president to call forth the militia in line with the
Constitution.92
The Calling Forth Act of 1792 gave the President the authority to
“call forth such number of the militia of the state or states most
convenient to the place of danger or scene of action, as he may judge
necessary to repel such invasion” in the event the United States “shall
be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign
nation or Indian tribe.”93 The Act also authorized the President call
forth the militia “to cause the laws to be duly executed” in the event
that ordinary judicial proceedings or the power of the federal marshals
is not enough to cease the obstruction of laws.94 Under the authority of
this statute, President Washington quashed the Whiskey Rebellion in
Pennsylvania two years after enactment, calling forth 13,000
militiamen from four states.95
The modern version of the Insurrection Act strongly resembles
the language of the early Calling Forth Act.96 The Insurrection Act is
broken into five sections, with sections 251–253 outlining the
President’s power to call forth the militia to execute the laws. Section
251 provides that “[w]henever there is an insurrection in any State
against its government, the President may, upon the request of its
legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call

91. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 88, at 31–32 n.224 (listing over 20 statutory
exceptions).
92. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (authorizing Congress “[t]o provide for calling forth the
Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions”).
93. Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1795).
94. Id.
95. WILLIAM C. BANKS & STEPHEN DYCUS, SOLDIERS ON THE HOME FRONT 50–51 (2016);
see also President George Washington, Proclamation of September 15, 1792, Founders Online,
NATIONAL ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-11-02-0058 (last
visited Dec. 11, 2018).
96. But see infra part VI for a discussion on the amendment to the Insurrection Act, 10
U.S.C. §§ 251-255, both passed and repealed in the years after Hurricane Katrina.
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into Federal service such of the militia of the other States.” 97 Section
252 may be invoked when “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or
assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States,
make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any
State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.”98 In such
circumstances, the President “may call into Federal service such of the
militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers
necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.”99 Section
253 enables the President to use the militia or the armed forces to
suppress “any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination,
or conspiracy, if it . . . hinders the execution of the laws of that State”
and “constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to
protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection.”100
It also applies when an insurrection “opposes or obstructs the
execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of
justice under those laws.” 101
Following the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, Congress briefly
amended Section 253 to clarify the circumstances when the
Insurrection Act could be invoked.102 The John Warner National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 was largely an
appropriations bill with one amendment to the Insurrection Act
“slipped in” that sparked significant outrage from state politicians.103
The revised version amended the language of the Act and provided
that the President “may employ the armed forces” to “restore public
order and enforce the laws . . . when, as a result of a natural disaster,
epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or
incident, or other condition in any State or possession of the United
States, the President determines that domestic violence has
occurred . . . .”104 The amendment triggered a strong response from
state governors who decried the amendment as a gross expansion of
97. 10 U.S.C. § 251 (2018).
98. 10 U.S.C. § 252 (2018).
99. Id.
100. 10 U.S.C. § 253 (2018).
101. Id.
102. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109364, § 1076, 120 Stat. 2083, 2404, repealed by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181 § 1068, 122 Stat. 3, 325. See infra Part VI for further discussion of the
amendment.
103. See 152 Cong. Rec. 21697 (2006) (statement of Senator Leahy) (“The implications of
changing the act are enormous, but this change was just slipped in the defense bill as a rider with
little study.”).
104. 10 U.S.C § 333 (2006) (emphasis added).
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federal power into their traditional role as commanders of each of their
state National Guard.105 The amendment was repealed a year later
following an outcry from all fifty state governors and members of
Congress.106
The Insurrection Act has only been used sporadically by
Presidents in recent years. Both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy
invoked the Insurrection Act to send federal troops to aid
desegregation,107 and President George H.W. Bush invoked the
Insurrection Act to help restore law and order in the midst of the
Rodney King riots in 1992.108 Although President George W. Bush
considered the Insurrection Act following reports of rioting and
lawlessness in Hurricane Katrina’s wake, federalism issues and public
opinion may have kept him from invoking the Act.109
IV. THE MILITARY RESPONSE
The military actors responding to disaster scenarios can be divided
into the National Guard, federal military forces, and State Defense
Forces. The National Guard, usually under the command and control
of the governor, is the primary military group responsible for disaster
response and relief. In situations where the local response is
overwhelmed, federal military forces—active duty Army, Navy,
Marine, and Air Force servicemen and women—can be called upon for
additional support. Many states also have state militias that can support
response activities.
A. The National Guard
The National Guard is usually a state’s most important military
asset in responding to natural disasters and lending military support to
local authorities. The National Guard is uniquely situated because they
can serve under a state governor or the President, depending on the
circumstances. First, in response to natural disasters, man-made
disasters, and Homeland Security missions, a state governor can

105. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Governors Resist Shifting Authority Over Guard, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 15, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/15/us/15governors.html (noting that the
governors claimed the amendment “would undermine their authority and autonomy”).
106. Id.; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181 §
1068, 122 Stat. 3, 325.
107. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 88, at 42.
108. Exec. Order No. 12804, 57 Fed. Reg. 19,361 (May 5, 1992) (providing for the restoration
of law and order in the city and county of Los Angeles, and other districts of California).
109. See infra Part V for further discussion of this sequence of events.
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activate the state National Guard to “state active duty” (SAD).110
Under SAD, the National Guard serves under the command of their
respective state governor through an adjutant general, receives state
benefits and payment, and is not subject to the restrictions of the
PCA.111
Second, the National Guard can serve under Title 32 status at the
request of the Governor and approval of the President.112 Under Title
32, the National Guard remains under the command of the state
governor and exempt from the PCA while receiving federal pay and
benefits.113 Title 32 status is particularly useful “for operations
spanning multiple states, as it eliminates the disparity in state pay rates
and ensures governors command integrity of the National Guard
forces.”114
Third, under Title 10, the President can federalize the National
Guard by either ordering the National Guard to active duty as reserves
or by calling the National Guard into Federal service as a militia.115
When serving under Title 10, “active duty” means full-time duty in the
active military service of the United States.116 Under Title 10, the
President serves as the Commander-in-Chief of the “activated”
National Guard units, and the National Guard troops are subject to the
restrictions of the PCA.117 Generally, Title 10 status is reserved for
international deployments.118
B. Federal Military Forces
Whereas the National Guard can operate under three different
duty statuses domestically, federal military forces—active and Reserve
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps troops—are always under
the command and control of the President under Title 10.119 As such,
110. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 44-75.1(4) (West 2018). See also STEVE BOWMAN ET AL., CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL33095, HURRICANE KATRINA: DOD DISASTER RESPONSE 7 (2005),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33095.pdf.
111. BOWMAN, supra note 110.
112. 32 U.S.C. § 502(f) (2018).
113. Id.; BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 110, at 8.
114. Ryan Burke, Lessons from Katrina: Commanding the Military During Disaster
Response—Then and Now, 12 INT. J. EMERGENCY. MGMT. 221, 223 (2016).
115. 10 U.S.C. § 12304 (2018).
116. 10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(1) (2018).
117. BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 110, at 9.
118. Burke, supra note 114 at 223.
119. Id.; see e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 3011 (2018) (“The Department of the Army is separately
organized under the Secretary of the Army. It operates under the authority, direction, and control
of the Secretary of Defense.”).
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federal military forces are subject to the restrictions of the PCA.120
Even with these restrictions, federal military forces play a role in
domestic disaster response, such as “[i]nfrastructure protection and
emergency repair” and “[e]mergency contracting support for lifesaving
and life-sustaining services.”121
Although the Coast Guard is part of the “armed forces” as defined
in 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4), the Coast Guard operates under the
Department of Homeland Security during peacetime.122 The President
or Congress can transfer the Coast Guard to the Department of the
Navy in times of war.123 Unlike other armed forces, Congress delegated
explicit law enforcement authority to the Coast Guard, thus exempting
it from the PCA.124
C. State Defense Forces
State Defense Forces (SDFs) are local military forces that operate
solely under the authority of state governments. SDFs were born out
of America’s longstanding militia tradition and the Second
Amendment.125 The Militia Act of 1903 brought all state militia forces
under the umbrella of the National Guard.126 However, when nearly all
National Guard troops mobilized in World War I, state governors
called for organized state militias.127 The Home Defense Act of 1917
permitted the states to organize state defense forces when the National
Guard was federalized.128 Congress officially recognized SDFs in 1956,
under Title 32 of the U.S. Code:
In addition to its National Guard, if any, a State, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, or the Virgin
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2018).
121. NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, supra note 65, at 34.
122. 14 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2018).
123. 14 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2018).
124. See 14 U.S.C. § 522 (2018) (“The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations,
inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United
States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the
United States.”); 14 U.S.C. § 703 (2018) (empowering “[c]ommissioned, warrant, and petty
officers of the Coast Guard” as customs officers”).
125. See U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”).
126. Militia Act of 1903, 32 Stat. 775 (1903).
127. See Eric Durr, New York Guard was Born in World War I as the National Guard Went
to War, U.S. ARMY (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.army.mil/article/186638/new_york_guard_was_
born_in_ world_war_i_as_the_national_guard_went_to_war (“That need to replace National
Guard Soldiers who had been protecting railroad bridges, water lines and canals resulted in the
creation of the New York Guard, the state’s volunteer self-defense force, on Aug. 3, 1917.”).
128. National Defense Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64–85, 39 Stat. 166.
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Islands may, as provided by its laws, organize and maintain defense
forces. A defense force established under this section may be used
within the jurisdiction concerned, as its chief executive (or
commanding general in the case of the District of Columbia)
considers necessary, but it may not be called, ordered, or drafted into
the armed forces.129

State defense forces are organized and authorized under state law,
in compliance with 32 U.S.C. § 109(c).130 As of 2012, more than 20 states
and Puerto Rico had established state guards, with total membership
over 14,000.131 Texas, Virginia, and Georgia, in particular, have robust
SDFs and even have SDF navies.132 Unlike the National Guard and
federal military forces, SDFs generally cannot be federalized and are
always under the command of their respective governors through an
adjutant general.133 However, like the National Guard, SDFs can
deploy to other states at the request of the governor.134 They are
generally used when the National Guard is “either undermanned,
federalized by the [P]resident under the Stafford Act, deployed in
support of federal forces, or eliminated by a foreign enemy.”135
Although SDFs and the National Guard work together under the

129. 32 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2018); see also 32 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1956).
130. For example, the Texas State Guard is defined as the “volunteer military forces that
provide community service and emergency response activities for this state, as organized under
the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, and operating as a defense force
authorized under 32 U.S.C. Section 109.” TEX. GOV’T CODE. ANN. § 437.001(16) (West 2018).
131. James Carafano et al., Why More States Should Establish State Defense Forces,
HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER 2 (Feb. 28, 2012), https://www.heritage.org/defense/
report/why-more-states-should-establish-state-defense-forces.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 3; but see infra Part VI for a brief discussion of the uncertainties regarding the
President’s ability to call forth SDFs.
134. See GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-91 (West 2018), which provides that:
(a) Upon the request of the governor of another state, the Governor in his discretion
may order all or any portion of the organized militia to assist the military or police forces
of the other state who are actually engaged in defending the other state. Such forces may
be recalled by the Governor at his discretion.
(b) The Governor in his discretion may request the governor of another state to order
all or any portion of the organized militia of the other state to assist the military or police
forces of this state who are actually engaged in defending this state.
135. Jonathon R. Pohnel, State Defense Forces and Their Role in American Homeland
Security (Mar. 2015) (unpublished master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School) (on file with the
Dudley Knox Library, Naval Postgraduate School), https://sgaus.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/10/15Mar_Pohnel_ Jonathan.pdf; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 44-54.4 (West 2018) (stating
that Virginia Defense Force shall “provide for an adequately trained organized reserve militia to
assume control . . . in the event of the mobilization of the Virginia National Guard” and “provide
a military force to respond to the call of the Governor in those circumstances described in § 4475.1.”). Circumstances included under VA. CODE ANN. § 44-75.1 (West 2018) include insurrection,
obstructing the execution of laws, natural or man-made disasters.
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adjutant general, members are prohibited from serving in the SDF and
the National Guard simultaneously.136
V. HURRICANES KATRINA AND CORA: HIGHLIGHTING THE NEED
FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION

Hurricane Katrina and “Hurricane Cora” serve as examples for
the military response to natural disasters. Hurricane Katrina provides
a real-life example of a catastrophic natural disaster that required a
massive mobilization of military forces to assist with relief. While
devastating, it serves as a case study for disaster management and
spurred an outpouring of academic literature on disaster response,
including in-depth critiques of the military’s role and the federalism
issues that may have hampered the military’s response time.137
Hurricane Cora, on the other hand, was a simulated hurricane used by
FEMA as part of its National Level Exercise 2018 to test emergency
response.138 This simulated hurricane hugged the East Coast of the
United States as a Category 4 hurricane from Florida until it made
landfall near Washington, D.C.139 This simulation is a useful example
for future disaster management because hurricanes may move further
north as a result of climate change, putting major cities like
Washington, D.C. and New York City at risk. It also provides a
scenario where five or more states could all be significantly impacted
from the same storm, highlighting the need for an integrated,
communicative, and centralized response network.
The federal military response to Hurricane Katrina highlights
many of the issues that could still affect the military response to natural
disasters today and serves as a reminder to prepare for worst-case
disaster scenarios. With a more flexible Insurrection Act and clearer
communication, President Bush’s response to Hurricane Katrina likely
would have occurred quicker and reduced some of the chaos
experienced in the first days following landfall. Hurricane Katrina

136. See 32 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2018) (“A person may not become a member of a defense force
established under subsection (c) if he is a member of a reserve component of the armed forces.”).
137. E.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-643, HURRICANE KATRINA:
BETTER PLANS AND EXERCISES NEEDED TO GUIDE THE MILITARY’S RESPONSE TO
CATASTROPHIC NATURAL DISASTERS 21 (2006) [hereinafter GAO HURRICANE KATRINA];
Christina E. Wells, Katrina and the Rhetoric of Federalism, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 127 (2007)
(discussing coordination and preparation failures during Hurricane Katrina).
138. FEMA, NATIONAL LEVEL EXERCISE 2018: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2018),
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1531489062928c7d82e3b92be153719688d9c6d71e1fb/
NLE_EXEC_SUMM2018_20180620_508PASS.PDF.
139. Id.
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presented a “perfect storm” of problems. First, the population of New
Orleans was highly vulnerable—large portions of the city fell below the
poverty line, lacked access to transportation, and lived in portions of
the city subject to flooding.140 Second, the state and local governments
inadequately responded to the oncoming hurricane.141 Third, a
significant portion of Louisiana’s National Guard troops were
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.142 Lastly, after landfall, many local
law enforcement officials abandoned their posts.143
With vast swaths of the city underwater and a dearth of law
enforcement officials to both maintain order and rescue stranded
citizens, Louisiana’s Governor Kathleen Blanco refused President
Bush’s request to federalize the National Guard under the Insurrection
Act and bring in federal troops.144 According to a Senate Special
Report issued in 2006, the reasons behind the delayed response remain
opaque.145 However, the Special Report notes that Governor Blanco
may have resisted attempts to federalize National Guard troops
because keeping the National Guard under state control would allow
them to serve as law enforcement, unfettered by the PCA.146
President Bush was faced with a dilemma: override Governor
Blanco and unilaterally deploy federal troops to Louisiana, or obey her

140. See generally Shirley B. Laska & Betty Hearn Morrow, Social Vulnerabilities and
Hurricane Katrina: An Unnatural Disaster in New Orleans, 40 MARINE TECH. SOC’Y J. 16 (2006).
141. See How New Orleans’ Evacuation Plan Fell Apart, NPR (Sept. 23, 2005),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4860776 (discussing how buses were
diverted to the Superdome—a shelter of last resort—during the evacuation because of traffic,
nursing homes failed to evacuate, and buses failed to return to the Superdome out of security
concerns); see also Wells, supra note 137, 137–40.
142. Brock N. Meeks, Guardsmen on a Rescue and Relief Mission, MSNBC (Aug. 30, 2005,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9117367/ns/us_news-katrina_the_long_road_back/t/guardsmenrescue-relief-mission/#.XBKis2hKjnE (“About 35 percent, or 3,000 Louisiana National Guard
troops, ‘[were] supporting deployed operations’ . . . .”); see HURRICANE KATRINA: DOD
DISASTER RESPONSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33095, 13–14 (2006) (finding that while DoD
officials denied any negative impact on disaster relief from overseas deployments, anecdotal
evidence suggests otherwise); BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 95, at 107 (“To complicate matters
further, much of the Louisiana guard’s critically needed equipment, including radios and
bulldozers, had been shipped to Iraq to support the ongoing war there.”).
143. Dan Barry & Jere Longman, A Police Department Racked by Doubt and Accusations,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/30/us/nationalspecial/a-policedepartment-racked-by-doubt-and-accusations.html.
144. Sean McGrane, Note, Katrina, Federalism, and Military Law Enforcement: A New
Exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1327 (2010).
145. S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, HURRICANE
KATRINA: A NATION STILL UNPREPARED 505 (2006), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
CRPT-109srpt322/pdf/ CRPT-109srpt322.pdf.
146. Id. at 506.
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request for local control over the response.147 Hanging in the balance
was a city in desperate need of assistance. President Bush deferred to
Governor Blanco and the “federal military response arrived late and
remained independent of state forces.”148 When federal troops did
arrive, they were widely viewed as the heroes of Hurricane Katrina,
and the military response peaked at more than 70,000 troops.149
Although troops played a critical role in the aftermath of Katrina,
a Government Accountability Office report found several areas of the
military’s response in need of improvement, including communication
and integration of military units.150 Hurricane Katrina “destroyed or
severely degraded many commercial landline and cellular telephone
systems, and emergency radio systems were oversubscribed making it
difficult to establish necessary connections between officials and
responders at the local, state, and federal levels.”151 Some National
Guard assets were sent with restrictions on their use, leaving some
areas with excess communication capabilities while others had none.152
Furthermore, the federal military forces were under the command and
control of Northern Command’s Joint Task Force Katrina, while the
National Guard forces were under command and control of the
Governors of Mississippi and Louisiana.153 Although response
operations were coordinated across the groups, they were not
integrated, which led to inefficiencies and duplication of effort.154
Now, ten years later, such inefficiencies could still threaten
disaster response. In 2018, following an “unprecedented” 2017
hurricane season, FEMA brought together governments, private
industry, and NGOs for a National Level Exercise to test their ability

147. Id. at 1318. One anonymous official stated that Bush’s failure to federalize the Louisiana
National Guard came down to a question of politics and bad optics:
“Can you imagine how it would have been perceived if a president of the United States of
one party had pre-emptively taken from the female governor of another party the
command and control of her forces, unless the security situation made it completely clear
that she was unable to effectively execute her command authority and that lawlessness was
the inevitable result?”
Eric Lipton et al., Political Issues Snarled Plans for Troop Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/09/us/nationalspecial/political-issues-snarled-plans-for-troopaid .html.
148. BANKS & DYCUS, supra note 95, at 106.
149. GAO HURRICANE KATRINA, supra note 137, at 21.
150. See generally id.
151. Id. at 25.
152. Id.
153. See generally id.
154. Id. at 26.
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to respond to a hurricane striking the Mid-Atlantic, a threat
comparable to Katrina.155 National Level Exercises are congressionally
mandated, biannual simulations to “test and evaluate the readiness of
Federal, State, local, and tribal governments to respond and recover in
a coordinated and unified manner to catastrophic incidents.”156 The
most recent National Level Exercise was a simulated Category 4
hurricane. In the model, Hurricane Cora made landfall near Hampton
Roads, Virginia “bringing a 15-foot (0.3 meter) storm surge and up to
9 inches (23 centimeters) of rain to some areas within the first six
hours.”157 Such a hurricane would directly impact Washington, D.C.,
Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Delaware with
indirect impacts likely felt throughout the Eastern seaboard.
The simulated results were certainly catastrophic. An Associated
Press article described the destruction:
In the scenario, Cora also slammed hurricane-force winds into three
nuclear power stations. One was damaged. Thirty-three major power
substations were at risk from storm surge and major flooding. Key
roads and bridges were also damaged, and debris blocked the
Newport News Channel and other waterways. Coast Guard Station
Cape Charles lost power, and Coast Guard Station Chincoteague
was severely damaged by high winds. The ferocious fictional storm
also damaged and closed Reagan National Airport in Washington.
The make-believe hurricane threatened hundreds of cell towers, and
the area where power was knocked out included 135 data centers in
Virginia and another 60 in Maryland.158

Unlike many of the recent hurricanes that have effects limited to
one or two states, a mid-Atlantic or northeastern landfall would
require a coordinated response effort across several states. In these
scenarios, natural disasters lose their localized character. In the same
way that Hurricane Katrina had far-reaching ramifications on oil
prices, a direct hurricane impact on Washington, D.C. or New York
City could have economic and political ramifications across the
country.159 Such a hurricane would disrupt both air and sea traffic,

155. FEMA to Conduct National Level Exercise, FEMA (May 2, 2018), https://www.fema.
gov/news-release/2018/05/02/fema-conduct-national-level-exercise; FEMA, supra note 138, at 1.
156. 6 U.S.C. § 748(b)(3)(A) (2018); National Level Exercise 2018, FEMA, https://www.fema.
gov/nle (last visited Dec. 12, 2018).
157. Jeff Martin, Category 4 Hurricane Devastates East Coast in FEMA Simulation,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 11, 2018), https://apnews.com/2a3ea3cb7cd949939120121d88de94bc.
158. Id.
159. E.g. Katrina and Oil Prices, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 7, 2015),
https://www.cfr.org/interview/katrina-and-oil-prices.
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leading to disruptions to some of the busiest airports and seaports in
the United States.
Both of these hurricane scenarios provide insight into disaster
preparation and response. The tragedy of Hurricane Katrina exposed
gaps in disaster preparation and provides positive proof of the need to
improve emergency response systems across all levels of government.
The possibility of an actual event like the Hurricane Cora exercise
raises similar questions about response issues that need to be addressed
promptly in the face of potential increases in hurricane frequency and
intensity.
VI. EXPANDING THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN A WARMING
WORLD
The local, state, and federal government should prepare for worstcase natural disaster scenarios, akin to Hurricanes Katrina and Cora.
Congress should clarify the powers of the President to call forth the
militia and provide a more flexible framework for federalization in
catastrophic disaster scenarios. Congress should also attempt to
remove the inefficiencies that led to the conflict between Governor
Blanco and President Bush in the days following Hurricane Katrina’s
landfall in Louisiana. Although it is possible that the President may
need to federalize the National Guard against a governor’s wishes, the
likelihood of that situation remains small. The President can still
provide military support and assistance without coming into conflict
with the PCA.
Furthermore, many natural disaster responses can be handled at
the local and state levels. However, with the threat of climate change
and ever-increasing natural disasters, states should invest in State
Defense Forces to better respond to natural disasters and reduce the
need for federal assistance. State defense forces can be a cost-effective,
local solution to a growing need for emergency responders.
A. The Tools for Effective Disaster Response
Congress should give the U.S. military the tools to effectively and
efficiently respond to catastrophic natural disasters, while specifying
the situations in which such tools can be used. To reduce any risk of
delaying disaster response in the future, the Federal and state
governments should address any potential federalism issues early, via
legislation or agency procedures.
Hurricane Cora highlighted some of the unusual problems
associated with a mid-Atlantic hurricane, including the interesting
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logistical scenario of having the President act as the Commander-inChief of the District of Columbia National Guard while state governors
would, at least initially, control their respective National Guards.160 It
would be possible for the President, through the Secretary of Defense,
to have to coordinate with state governors to have non-District of
Columbia National Guard units operating in Washington, D.C. These
National Guard units would probably not be considered “federalized”
but would still effectively be operating under the command of the
President. In this scenario, it is unclear whether they would fall under
Title 32 or Title 10 status. The distinction may not have a functional
impact but could slow the response time by creating confusion over the
scope of their abilities and their command structure in the same way
that federalism questions stalled the Katrina response.
One proposed solution—the use of a dual commander for multistate disaster response—was codified in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.161 A dual-status commander
(DSC) acts either under state status or under Title 10 as a Federal
officer but may receive orders from either chain of command.162 The
new provision states that:
When the Armed Forces and the National Guard are employed
simultaneously in support of civil authorities in the United States,
appointment of a commissioned officer as a dual-status
commander . . . should be the usual and customary command and
control arrangement, including for missions involving a major
disaster or emergency as those terms are defined in section 102 of
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act (42 U.S.C. § 5122).163

160. D.C. CODE ANN. § 49-409 (2019) (“The President of the United States shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of the militia of the District of Columbia.”). While the President is the
Commander-in-Chief, Executive Order 11,485 “authorized and directed [the Secretary of
Defense] to supervise, administer and control the Army National Guard and the Air National
Guard of the District of Columbia . . . while in militia status.” Executive Order 11,485 also states
that the Secretary of Defense “may order out the National Guard under title 39 of the District of
Columbia Code to aid the civil authorities of the District of Columbia” but that such orders are
“subject to the direction of the President as Commander-in-Chief.” Exec. Order No. 11,485, 34
Fed. Reg. 15439, 15443 (Oct. 4, 1969).
161. See generally National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 11281, § 515, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/1540/text.
162. CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS (CLAMO), DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL
LAW 2018 HANDBOOK FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 68 (2018), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_
Law/pdf/ domestic-law-handbook-2018.pdf.
163. 10 U.S.C. § 12304a(c)(1) (2018).
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Although the use of a DSC has been generally successful,164 it is
reasonable to prepare for a Katrina-like scenario where a governor
refuses to assent to a DSC.165 Because both the state and the President
have to agree to install a DSC,166 it may be beneficial to create a
procedure that can be used in lieu of mutual agreement or to trump
mutual agreement. For example, additional language could make the
dual-status command the only command structure, other than
Presidential control, in “major disasters” or “emergencies” that
involve more than one state. Similarly, a procedure should be
established for conflicting orders from both chains of command. While
DoD directives currently advise the DSC to seek counsel from a Judge
Advocate from each chain of command, it does not provide instruction
if both sides refuse to agree.167 While one possible solution is to dissolve
the dual-status commander role, DoD should further clarify this to
prevent delays if the situation arose in the future. Except in this unique
circumstance, the use of a DSC should be a far less contentious
alternative to the invocation of the Insurrection Act because it
addresses federalism concerns by keeping some state control over the
National Guard.
Another proposed solution would be to re-adopt the 2007
amendment to the Insurrection Act to clarify when the President may
invoke the act following a natural disaster. The Insurrection Act is only
invoked in extraordinary situations. Most natural disasters are
relatively local and will not require large-scale federal intervention;
however, Congress should plan for a worst-case scenario and ensure
that the President is not hindered by federalism questions. Although
there is a long American tradition of separating the U.S. military from
domestic policing, the exceptions to the PCA undermine this
distinction. While the National Guard under the command and control
of a governor can enforce laws, the same National Guard loses that
power when under the command and control of the President.168 If one
of the concerns related to the military enforcing laws is a lack of

164. RYAN BURKE & SUE MCNEIL, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, TOWARD A UNIFIED
MILITARY RESPONSE: HURRICANE SANDY AND THE DUAL STATUS COMMANDER 54–61 (2015).
165. Notably, President Bush and Governor Blanco discussed the prospect of using a dualstatus commander following the landfall of Hurricane Katrina. Governor Blanco refused. S.
COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, supra note 145, at 70.
166. Dual Status Commander (DSC), NAT’L GUARD (Dec. 2017), https://www.nationalguard
.mil/Portals/31/Resources/Fact%20Sheets/Dual%20Status%20Commander%20Fact%20Sheet
%20(Dec.%202017).pdf
167. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 78, at D-2–D-3.
168. NAT’L GUARD, supra note 166.
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training or familiarity with domestic law, then this distinction between
the federalized National Guard and state-controlled National Guard
appears arbitrary. The same National Guard troops that could enforce
laws under state control could not do so under federal control. The
2007 amendment to the Insurrection Act would have allowed the
President to invoke the Act in response to a natural disaster and utilize
the armed forces and the National Guard to enforce laws and “restore
public order.”169 Thus, the National Guard would be able to act as law
enforcement even under federal control in instances specifically listed
in the statute.170 Congress should reconsider the 2007 amendment to
the Insurrection Act or consider alternative exceptions to the PCA that
would only activate in response to a major natural disaster.
The Senate Armed Service Committee characterized the 2007
amendment to the PCA as:
[A] provision that would update the Insurrection Act to clarify the
President’s authority to use the armed forces, including the National
Guard in federal service, to restore order and enforce federal laws in
cases where, as a result of a terrorist attack, epidemic, or natural
disaster, public order has broken down.171

The Senate Committee Report on the amendment further stated that
the pre-amendment Insurrection Act “grant[ed] the President broad
powers to use the armed forces in situations of public disorder . . . .”172
However, “the antique terminology and the lack of explicit reference
to such situations as natural disasters or terrorist attacks may have
contributed to a reluctance to use the armed forces in situations such
as Hurricane Katrina.”173 The report also noted that the President’s
authority is temporary and subject to notification requirements to
Congress.174
The most notable change to the Insurrection Act from the
amendment came in the form of enumerated instances—”natural
disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist
attack or incident”—that could cause “domestic violence” to such an

169. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109364, § 1076, 120 Stat. 2083, 2404, repealed by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181 § 1068, 122 Stat. 3, 325. For an in-depth discussion of the changes to the
Insurrection Act resulting from the 2007 amendment, see Thaddeus A. Hoffmeister, An
Insurrection Act for the 21st Century, 39 STETSON L. REV. 861 (2010).
170. See id.
171. S. Rep. No. 109-254, at 5 (2006).
172. Id. at 384.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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extent that the state is unable to maintain public order.175 In these
instances, the President “may employ the armed forces, including the
National Guard in Federal service, to restore public order and enforce
the laws of the United States . . . .”176
While Senator Leahy and all fifty governors railed against the
amendment as a gross expansion of presidential power and an
infringement on states’ rights,177 at least one commentator believes that
the amendment did nothing to change the President’s substantive
powers but rather clarified when the Insurrection Act could be used.178
Congress should reconsider this amendment and allow for a robust
debate, rather than hiding the amendment in an appropriations bill.
Many of the changes to the Insurrection Act are likely less offensive
than the state governors feared.179
If Congress keeps the unamended Insurrection Act, Congress
should consider providing statutory definitions to some of the terms in
the Act to clarify the circumstances in which the Act can be invoked.
The Insurrection Act is riddled with undefined words and phrases that
hinder its effective use. While courts have generally interpreted
“insurrection” to mean an armed uprising against the government,
Presidents have interpreted it to mean anything from a riot to an
uprising.180 Congress could provide definitions for some of the terms,
like “insurrection” and “domestic violence,” that would specifically
address events following catastrophic natural disasters. This would
achieve effectively the same result as amending the Insurrection Act
directly without altering the original terminology.

175. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, supra note 102.
176. Id. Compare this with the current Insurrection Act that states: “The President, by using
the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he
considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful
combination, or conspiracy” that hinders or obstructs the execution of the laws. 10 U.S.C. § 253.
177. See 152 Cong. Rec. 21696 (2006) (remarks by Senator Leahy) (stating that the
amendment “subvert[s] solid, longstanding posse comitatus statutes that limit the military’s
involvement in law enforcement, thereby making it easier for the President to declare martial
law”); David S. Broder, Governors Wary of Change on Troops, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2006)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/08/05/AR2006080500732.html,
(“Iowa Gov. Tom Vilsack, the senior Democrat, called the proposal ‘one step away from a
complete takeover of the National Guard, the end of the Guard as a dual-function force that can
respond to both state and national needs.’”).
178. Danielle Crockett, The Insurrection Act and Executive Power to Respond with Force
to Natural Disasters 3–4 (unpublished research paper, available online with Berkeley Law library
at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/resources/disasters/Crockett.pdf).
179. Hoffmeister, supra note 169 at 901–03.
180. Id. at 901 n.248.
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The 2007 amendment also altered what military forces the
President can call forth by changing the word “militia” to “National
Guard.”181 While this may seem like a minor change, it could actually
limit the military forces that the President can call forth by prohibiting
the federalization of state militias, or SDFs.182 Under the current
Insurrection Act, the President can rely on the “militia or the armed
forces” to enforce laws.183 While 32 U.S.C. § 109(c) states that SDFs
“may not be called, ordered, or drafted into the armed forces,” it is
currently unclear whether or not this exempts SDFs from ever being
federalized. In Perpich v. Department of Defense, the Supreme Court
refused to decide the issue but stated that “[i]t is nonetheless possible
that [SDFs] are subject to call under [the Insurrection Act] which
distinguish the ‘militia’ from the ‘armed forces,’ and which appear to
subject all portions of the ‘militia’—organized or not—to call if needed
for the purposes specified in the Militia Clauses.”184 In short, the
amendment provided a stronger guarantee that SDFs would remain
under state-control if the Insurrection Act were invoked than the
current version of the Act. This, combined with more robust SDFs,
could address some of the governors’ concerns about federal
usurpation of their control over state military forces.
In addition to the original changes made in the 2007 amendment—
namely specifying causes of domestic violence, changing the term
“militia” to “National Guard,” and making the President’s decision to
employ the armed forces to restore order discretionary185—Congress
could institute more checks on the President’s power. Congress might
insert a ten-day time limit to § 233, like the Stafford Act’s emergency
powers provision, that can be extended with a request from the

181. Compare 10 U.S.C. § 253 (“The President, by using the militia or the armed forces . . .
.”), with John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, supra note 102
(“The President may employ the armed forces, including the National Guard in Federal
service . . . .”).
182. See Hoffmeister, supra note 169 at 902–03 (noting that the 2007 amendment would have
limited the President to calling forth federal armed forces and the National Guard, not SDFs).
183. 10 U.S.C. § 253.
184. 496 U.S. 334, 352 n.25 (1990). Note that at the time of this decision, the Insurrection Act
was codified at § 333.
185. See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, supra note
102 (changing 10 U.S.C. § 333, now 10 U.S.C. § 253, from the President “shall take such measures
as he considers necessary” to “[t]he President may employ the armed forces”) (emphasis added);
see also Hoffmeister, supra note 169 at 903 (noting that the amendment made Presidential action
optional).
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governor or through congressional approval.186 But, by only adding a
ten-day limit to § 233 which specifically addresses natural disasters, the
President would still have the ability to invoke § 231 or § 232 should
the situation call for it.
Several commentators have proposed federalism checks to the
Insurrection Act, such as requiring judicial approval to federalize the
militia.187 Perhaps a more effective federalism check is already codified
in § 231. Section 231 provides that in the event of insurrection, “the
President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if
the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service . . . the
militia.”188 Prior to landfall, in the case of hurricanes, the state
legislature can plan to call a special session to take place a few days
later.189 This would allow the state legislature, without the input of the
governor, to meet and request Federal intervention via the
Insurrection Act.
A potentially controversial but effective method could be
extending the request power to the local governments of large
metropolitan areas. Mayors or city councils would be more intimately
aware of the conditions in their area and could provide a better picture
of “domestic violence” in their communities.190 Formal requests from
local governments could also provide political cover and support for
the President’s decision to federalize troops. While the President will
186. See 42 U.S.C. § 5170b (“Such emergency work may only be carried out for a period not
to exceed 10 days.”). Note that Congress has recognized the broad powers conferred to the
Department of Defense under the Stafford Act. Title 6 of the U.S. Code states:
[T]he Posse Comitatus Act is not a complete barrier to the use of the Armed Forces for
a range of domestic purposes, including law enforcement functions, when the use of the
Armed Forces is authorized by Act of Congress or the President determines that the use
of the Armed Forces is required to fulfill the President’s obligations under the
Constitution to respond promptly in time of war, insurrection, or other serious
emergency.
6 U.S.C. § 466 (2018) (emphasis added). Existing laws, including chapter 15 of title 10 (commonly
known as the “Insurrection Act”), and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.), grant the President broad powers that may be invoked in
the event of domestic emergencies, including an attack against the Nation using weapons of mass
destruction, and these laws specifically authorize the President to use the Armed Forces to help
restore public order.
187. McGrane, supra note 144, at 1333; Hoffmeister, supra note 169 at 914.
188. 10 U.S.C. § 251 (emphasis added).
189. N.C. Legislature to Convene October 2nd for Hurricane Florence Relief Session,
ABERDEEN TIMES (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.aberdeentimes.com/goverment/localgovernment-news/9272-n-c-legislature-to-convene-october-2-for-hurricane-florence-reliefsession.
190. See 10 U.S.C. § 253 (“The President . . .shall take such measures as he considers
necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or
conspiracy”) (emphasis added).
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only rarely need to invoke the Insurrection Act in the wake of a natural
disaster, Congress should streamline the process and account for
federalism concerns now before such a disaster arises.
B. When in Doubt, Organize a Militia: SDFs as a Response to
Federalism Concerns
The Insurrection and the Stafford Acts are invoked only when
local and state resources are overwhelmed. States that feel threatened
by changes to the Insurrection Act could do more to ensure that their
local resources will not be overwhelmed, such as creating a robust State
Defense Force (SDF). SDFs are trained, local, and organized militias
that can augment state resources as emergency responders, law
enforcement, or support to the National Guard. When federal aid can
take days to arrive, access to a reliable, local source is essential in a
disaster scenario. Regardless of changes to the Insurrection Act, states
should strongly consider forming SDFs in light of changes in climate
and the resulting disaster scenarios. In particular, the three states
susceptible to hurricanes that do not currently have a SDF—Florida,
North Carolina, and Alabama—should strongly consider creating one.
To both avoid federalism concerns and quickly respond to disasters,
states should strive to be as minimally dependent on the federal
government for disaster response as possible.
There are many advantages to SDFs over federal military forces
and out-of-state National Guard units. First, they reside in their
respective states and can therefore respond quickly. Second, unlike
their National Guard counterparts, they cannot be deployed or
federalized.191 Third, SDFs can be specially trained for particular types
of disasters or emergencies, and each state can determine what training
their SDFs receive.192 Because SDFs are flexible, they can be utilized
for a variety of functions. Rather than only supplementing National
Guard units, SDFs can serve as emergency responders and be stationed

191. Although many commentators have maintained this, in extraordinary instances it may
be possible for the President to call forth state defense forces. See Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496
U.S. 334, 352 n.25 (1990) (“It is nonetheless possible that [SDFs] are subject to call under 10
U.S.C. §§ 331–333, which distinguish the ‘militia’ from the ‘armed forces,’ and which appear to
subject all portions of the ‘militia’—organized or not—to call if needed for the purposes specified
in the Militia Clauses.”).
192. See Kent G. Sieg, America’s State Defense Forces: An Historical Component of National
Defense, 1 STATE DEF. FORCE J. 1, 7 (2005), http://www.sdfpubcntr.net/introduction.htm
(“Individual members of these guards can be trained to provide for physical security, crowd
control, and medical and logistical support to reserve and regular forces as well as to local and
state authorities.”).
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in communities across the state to quickly respond to local needs.193
Some states, like Texas and Maryland, even utilize SDFs to provide
medical care and support in emergency situations.194
Although they have certain drawbacks, including inconsistent use,
lack of training, and a history of scandals,195 SDFs provide a relatively
inexpensive and local supplement to emergency responders and
National Guard units. Representative Joe Wilson of South Carolina
attempted to address some of these issues with the State Defense
Improvement Act in 2009. The proposed bill aimed “to improve the
readiness of State defense forces and to increase military coordination
for homeland security between the States and the Department of
Defense.”196 It also intended to address gaps in current legislation
pertaining to SDFs. The bill called for the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Secretary of Defense to coordinate homeland security
efforts with SDFs and clarified DoD and Homeland Security’s ability
to provide training to SDFs.197 The bill also allowed for the Secretary
of Defense to transfer excess DoD property to SDFs.198
While the bill never made it out of committee, it does provide a
roadmap of improvements that can be made to the current SDF
framework; states should address coordination, training, public
perception, recruitment, and funding issues related to SDFs. First,
there should be increased collaboration and integration amongst
National Guard and SDF forces. Notably, the National Guard may
train with SDFs but cannot use federal funds to do so.199 While states

193. See Pohnel, supra note 135 (proposing that “SDF members could be arranged like local
volunteer firemen”).
194. Ralph Jay Johnson, Paramilitary Provision of Adequate Disaster Response and
Advancement of Public Health: The Case of the Texas State Guard and Operation Lone Star, 11
DISASTER MED. PUB. HEALTH PREP. 412 (2017);
Charles E. Wiles & H. Wayne Nelson, “The National Guard for the National Guard” State Defense
Force Medical Support for the National Guard, 174 MILITARY MED. xii, xii (2009).
195. Eric Kelderman, State Defense Forces Grow, Project New Image, STATELINE (Dec. 31,
2003), https://web.archive.org/web/20120712202018/http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/
headlines/state-defense-forces-grow-project-new-image-85899393830 (noting that the Virginia
General Assembly investigated its state defense force in 1990 on reports that “a brigade was
saving money to buy a tank and other units were practicing ad hoc drug raids,” and that Utah
disbanded its state guard in 1987 “amid media reports that convicted felons and members of the
white supremacist Aryan Nations had infiltrated the organization”).
196. State Defense Force Improvement Act, H.R. 206, 11th Cong. (2009).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. NAT’L GUARD BUREAU, CNGBI 5500.01, NATIONAL GUARD INTERACTION WITH
STATE DEFENSE FORCES, para. 4 (June 15, 2017) (“It is NG policy that the NG may interact with
SDFs to train and conduct exercises and maneuvers in support of domestic or civil support
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are responsible for funding their SDFs, it may be beneficial to
introduce Federal legislation that would allow limited federal funding
to be used for training purposes. In a real-life disaster scenario, SDFs
will work alongside the National Guard and active troops, if necessary.
SDFs will also work with various other state and federal agencies,
including FEMA. It is in their interests to make sure SDFs are trained
and have sufficient resources. Federal and state governments should
ensure that the role of SDFs are sufficiently addressed in emergency
planning. Because SDFs operate under state command, officials should
ensure that protocols addressing the proper lines of communication
and command are in place if the President places the National Guard
under Title 10 control.200
Second, SDF forces should be held to a similar standard as the
National Guard, including commitment to training. A 2014 report by
the Inspector General of the DoD found that U.S. Northern Command
staff believed SDFs “lacked national military standards, qualifications,
Federal background checks, and the means to verify readiness.” As
such, the Inspector General’s office did not consider or include SDFs
for military planning.201 To address these concerns, states should
consider imposing regulations similar to those applicable to the
National Guard.202 The State Guard Association of the United States
should also take a more active role in encouraging uniformity in SDF
training and fitness requirements across states and more national SDF
training exercises.
Third, states should invest in public education around SDFs to
promote recruitment and improve the public’s understanding of the
program. Because many states do not have SDFs and the SDFs that do
exist are relatively small, much of the country is unaware of their
existence. A state militia, in most cases, is seen as a relic of pre-Civil
War America. The public is likely to embrace SDFs with the
understanding that they are akin to the National Guard. States should

operations, as appropriate . . . [t]he NG will not spend Federal funds, to include pay and
allowances, subsistence, transportation, medical care and treatment, or use of Federal equipment
for activities with the primary purpose of training or otherwise for the support of SDFs . . . .”).
200. Since SDFs operate under state control, federalization of the National Guard resulting
in a new Federal command structure could cause communication gaps between the two
organizations.
201. INSPECTOR GEN. DEPT. OF DEF., DODIG-2014-065, EVALUATION OF DEP’T OF
DEFENSE INTERACTION WITH STATE DEFENSE FORCES 22 (2014), https://media.defense.gov/
2014/Apr/30/ 2001713359/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2014-065.pdf.
202. See 32 U.S.C. § 502 (2018) (requiring the National Guard to have drills or instruction 48
times per year and training at least 15 days per year).
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also actively try to distance SDFs from the right-wing militia
movement.203 As such, states may also wish to rename their SDFs to
reflect the connection to the National Guard, such as the Texas State
Guard, or to refer to their emergency response role, like State
Emergency Guard.
Fourth, SDFs are relatively inexpensive. Since an SDF is a
volunteer military organization, “[t]here is no general requirement for
a budget to cover such costs as salaries, facilities, equipment, training,
travel, and general and administrative expenses. Each state legislature
determines precisely what will be covered, at what cost, and for how
long.”204 States should invest more in SDFs to attract qualified
individuals and provide long-term stability to the organization, such as
offering incentives to enlist. Texas, for example, offers several benefits,
including stipends for training and activations, travel allowances during
activations, free concealed handgun and hunting licenses, waived toll
road fees, job protections when called to duty, college tuition
assistance, and paid military leave for state employees.205
Funding provides an interesting phenomenon with regards to
natural disaster relief and emergency planning. Response has
traditionally fallen on local and state governments with the Federal
government providing support in emergencies or major natural
disasters.206 Climate change, however, poses serious questions of equity
in paying for disaster relief. It is the result of years of greenhouse gas
emissions from all over the world, and all Americans have contributed
to climate change in some form. This begs the question: should states,
the Southeast in particular, bear the costs of climate change in the form
of intensifying hurricanes when South Dakotans, Washingtonians,
Iowans, and citizens of every other state have exacerbated the problem
to some degree?207
203. Martin Hershkowitz, Homeland Security: The Military’s Confusing Role, 2 STATE DEF.
FORCE J. 1, 35 (2006) (“SDFs, by their own admission, suffer from the public perception of a
‘“state militia,’” with all of its anti-government (think ‘“Ruby Ridge’”) connotations. This
association could create a negative public perception of the Air Force i.e. condoning and
supporting ultra-conservative groups, without full public understanding of these groups.”).
204. James Carafano et al., supra note 131, at 9.
205. Texas State Guard FAQ, TEXAS MILITARY DEP’T, (last visited Dec. 12, 2018),
https://tmd.texas.gov/texas-state-guard-faq.
206. See generally Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, supra
note 57.
207. While most of the U.S. is likely to be financially impacted by climate change in some
way, the costs of hurricanes to the Southeast are particularly high and are being incurred now.
The estimated costs of the 2017 major hurricanes, were over 17 times higher than the Camp Fire.
Compare Office for Coastal Management, Hurricane Costs, NOAA (last modified Mar. 28, 2019),
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In order to pay for SDFs and other disaster measures, states
should consider a revenue source that draws from citizens and noncitizens alike, thereby allocating some of the costs of disaster relief
generally to out-of-state greenhouse gas emitters. Some possible
examples include increased tolls or a “tourism tax” on lodging and car
rentals that would specifically go to funding SDFs. State residents
should also pay appropriate property taxes or sales taxes to
compensate for disaster risk. While some states have adopted an
increased sales tax to pay for conservation and outdoor recreation,208
states could choose to adopt a similar model dedicated to disaster
mitigation and management, including SDFs. Some costs could also be
covered by a similar proposal to H.R. 206 that allowed surplus DoD
property to be transferred to SDFs.209
Major disasters spread U.S. military resources thin. Over the
course of the active 2017 hurricane season, “some 67,000 DoD and
National Guard personnel responded to help civil authorities.210 In
October, the Pentagon noted that “new U.S. forces flowing into
Afghanistan have been delayed due to hurricane relief efforts.”211 A
recent report by the Heritage Foundation listed Army and Marine
Corps readiness as “weak” in light of operational demands and a lack
of funding.212 The Air Force and Navy fared slightly better and received
https://coast.noaa.gov/states/fast-facts/hurricane-costs.html (stating that the major 2017
hurricanes cost an estimated $226 billion), with CoreLogic, The Camp and Woolsey Wildfires in
California Cause Devastating Losses Between $15 Billion and $19 Billion According to CoreLogic
(Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.corelogic.com/news/the-camp-and-woolsey-wildfires-in-californiacause-devastating-losses-between-15-billion-and-19-billion-according-to-corelogic.aspx?WT.
mc_id=crlg_181126_hC1gk (estimating $11 to $13 billion in losses from the Camp Fire). The
EPA estimates that by 2090, extreme temperatures will cost $160 billion dollars in lost wages for
the entire United States. However, the impacts of extreme temperature will be felt worst in places
like Florida and Texas which are also the most affected by hurricanes. EPA, MULTI-MODEL
FRAMEWORK FOR QUANTITATIVE SECTORAL IMPACTS ANALYSIS 54 (2017) (“Loss of labor
hours across the U.S. is projected to be very costly, totaling over $160 billion in lost wages per
year by 2090 (range from $87- $220 billion). More than a third of this national loss is projected to
occur in the Southeast ($47 billion annually).”)
208. William Petroski, Iowa Sales Tax Hike For Outdoors Advances, But Faces Uphill Battle,
DES MOINES REG., (Mar. 17, 2015),
https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/
2015/03/17/iowa-outdoors-natural-tax/24909279/.
209. State Defense Force Improvement Act, supra note 196.
210. Jeff Daniels, From Hurricanes to Fires, 2017 Disasters Tested DoD amid Concern that
Forces are Stretched Thin, CNBC (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/22/disasters-in2017-tested-pentagon-amid-concern-forces-stretched-thin.html.
211. Jeff Daniels, Storm Relief Strains US military as New Report Gives Sober Look at
Readiness, CNBC (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/05/storm-relief-strains-usmilitary-as-heritage-sees-readiness-woes.html.
212. THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 2019 INDEX OF U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH,
https://www.heritage.org/military-strength (2019).
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a score of “marginal” in the readiness category.213 Since SDF
operations are limited to tasks within the United States, robust SDFs
can take pressure off U.S. military forces to respond to multiple
disasters and reduce the need for troops that would otherwise be
engaged in overseas operations. SDFs should work together with DoD
and the Department of Homeland Security to create guidelines or best
practices for how to train and integrate SDFs in disaster management.
VII. CONCLUSION
Climate change is likely worsening the impact of natural disasters
in the United States, and all levels of government should prepare for a
Katrina-like catastrophic disaster scenario. Congress should address
statutory roadblocks to create a streamlined response to catastrophic
disasters. Federal agencies, including DoD, should establish
emergency protocols that assess all possible scenarios and provide for
coordination across emergency groups. States should invest in SDFs
and strengthen their local response capabilities.
While the military currently plays a significant role in effectively
responding to natural disasters, climate change itself requires a
collaborative and integrated response across all levels and all divisions
of government. In particular, all levels of government need to address
one of the fundamental problems underlying disaster planning and
response—human migration to disaster-prone areas. As climate
change is increasingly enhancing the strength and frequency of
hurricanes, floods, and wildfires, people continue to move to the most
disaster-prone states, like Florida, Texas, and California.
Local and state governments need to use their police powers to
move citizens away from risk-prone areas and improve building code
standards to adjust to a changing climate. Local and state governments
control zoning ordinances that allow citizens to build in risky areas,
such as floodplains or coastal areas. Local and state governments can
also disincentivize building in these high risk areas.
It is also up to the federal government to adopt legislation to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and tackle climate change. Effective
legislation could mitigate climate change impacts that are already being
felt in the United States and reduce future damage. It is up to
policymakers to ease the burden of disaster relief by directly
confronting climate change and gradually moving people and property

213. Id.
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out of high-risk areas. The less people and property are impacted, the
less need for a military response.

